CHASE v. CHENEY.

We have said all for which we can afford space, or our readers
probably find patience, as to the more common grounds of the
public misapprehension, in regard both to the rights and duties
of the legal profession. We hope, sometime, to discuss the misapprehensions and shortcomings of the profession, which, in our
apprehension, are neither few nor unimportant.
I. F. R.
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Civil courts will interfere with churches or religious associations when rights of
property or civil rights are involved, but where there is no other right involved
than the clerical office, the decision of an ecclesiastical court as to its own jurisdiction under the canons of the association, is conclusive.
The right to preach the gospel to all who choose to listen is free to every citizen,
but the right to preach it as a clergyman of an organized church with established
doctrines and forms of worship, is limited by the will of the church, and when a
minister enters a church he becomes bound by the rules and subject to the authority
of the ecclesiastical government of the church.
By the canons of the Episcopal Church when a presentment against a presbyter
for non-conformity is made in due form and citation is issued and served, the
ecclesiastical court has jurisdiction to proceed to determine the cause.
The recital by the Bishop in the commission that he acted on "credible information" does not affect the regularity of the proceedings. The canon requires
the bishop to appoint three persons to examine and make presentment, and such
appointment need not be in writing.
The presentment is the substantial foundation of the proceedings, and its sufficiency can not be inquired into by a civil courL
Even if the sufficiency of the presentment could be inquired into by a civil
court, it is not to be tested by the strict rules of criminal pleading, and suffi.
cient certainty to enable the accused to know the nature and substance of the charge
is all that can be required.
Per LAwREN E, C. J., and SHELDoN, J., dissenting: The civil courts ought to
take cognisance of the case so far as to ascertain whether the ecclesiastical court
is constituted in accordance with the canons of the church. By joining the church,
which is a voluntary organization, the presbyter agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of a tribunal organized in accordance with the canons, but he has not agreed
to submit to any other, and if a court improperly constituted assumes to try him
for an offence which may involve loss of his ecclesiastical office, he has a right
to invoke the protection of the civil courts of the state.

TiS was a bill in equity, filed in the Superior Court of Chicago, to enJoin plaintiffs in error as an ecclesiastical court, from
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proceeding with the trial of the defendant, for alleged offences
and misconduct as a presbyter of the diocese of Illinois, and rector
of Christ Church, in the city of Chicago.
An injunction was granted, and thereupon defendants appealed
to this Court.
The bill alleged the issuing of a commission, by the bishop of the
diocese, appointing three persons as presenters; the finding the
presentment; and a citation giving notice of the time and place
of trial; that the accused, in person and by counsel, appeared
when the court was organized, und preferred objections to the validity of all the papers, which were overruled, and claimed his right
of challenge of the persons who were selected to try the issue,
which was denied; that the commission, presentment and citation
were void, and gave no authority to the assessors; that the accused
received from his parish $4500 per annum, and enjoyed a rectory,
rent free, and had received numerous calls from other parishes,
in other dioceses, at much higher salaries; that he had not been
guilty of any offence for which he was liable to be tried, and yet
the bishop was prejudiced against him, had prejudged his case,
and was determined to convict and deprive him of his position and
its emoluments; that the respondents were selected to condemn;
they sympathized with the bishop, and, with him, belonged to the
High Church party; and that complainant was attached to the
Low Church party in the Protestant Episcopal Church; and he
and the bishop are diametrically opposed in their views.
W. C. Goudy and S. 0. Judd, for appellants.
Melville IF. Fuller, for appellee.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
THORNTON, J. [After stating the facts.]-Without asserting the
power of this court, in cases of this character, yet, on account of
the earnest, and able, and elaborate arguments of counsel, we
will notice the objection, that the spiritual court had no authority
to adjudicate upon the alleged offence.
The objections are these: First, The bishop, by a recital in the
commission that the information upon which he acted was " credible information," excludes the hypothesis that he exercised the
power of appointment in either of the three modes mentioned in
Section 2 of canon 20, and that he could only proceed as directed
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therein. Second, That the presentment was insufficient in specification of time, place, and circumstance. Third, That eight
presbyters did not appear, but only five, at the time and place of
trial, when the attempted organization of the court took place,
and that the accused was denied his right of challenge. Fourth,
That there was in fact no notice given of the trial.
Except one, these objections are extremely technical.
There is in evidence a commission, issued by the bishop, appointing three persons to investigate the charge and make presentment. Presentment was found, containing three charges and
divers specifications, as to offences committed while officiating as
rector of Christ Church, in Chicago. A citation was signed by
the bishop, fixing the time and place of trial, which, with a copy
of the presentment, was duly served. The citation furnished the
names of eight presbyters, from whom the accused might select
five, or three, as assessors, and allowed twelve days in which to
make the selection.
Was a commission necessary to confer jurisdiction ? Did the
court or the accused have any right to call for it ? Concede that
the bishop did not obtain his information from either of the sources
specified in the canon, is the jurisdiction of the court thereby ousted ? The canon requires no commission to be issued. By the
canon the appointment need not be in writing. The bishop is
compelled to appoint three persons to examine the case and presentment make. He performs this duty in such manner as he
may choose.
If the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person, it bad power to proceed. The subject-matter was contained
in the presentment, not in the commission. The person had been
summoned, and was present. Therefore, neither the source nor
character of the facts dommunicated to the bishop, except as contained in the presentment, were proper subjects for inquiry by the
church court. The offence charged was the, matter to be investigated-the fact to be tried. If the accused had violated the
constitution of his church, his engagement to conform to its doctrines and worship, and his ordination vow, as alleged, such violations could not be palliated by the errors of the bishop. If the
bishop disregarded the canons, and transcended the limits of his
power, as diocesan, he is amenable therefor, and liable to trial
before his brother bishops. IHis transgression cannot excuse the
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wrongful act of another-cannot be pleaded in justification, or to
the jurisdiction. The court, then, upon presentment made, and
due service, had power to take cognisance of, and decide, the
case.
This view is sustained by a careful examination of the canon.
Section 1 of canon 20, in prescribing the duties of the presenters,
says: 11If there be, in their opinion, sufficient grounds for a presentment, they shall present such clergyman to the bishop, who
shall, thereupon, cause a copy of said presentment, together with
a citation to appear and answer thereto, to be served upon the
accused with all convenient speed."
Section seven of the same canon, in reference to the duties of
the presbyters who may compose the court, says: "They shall
declare in a writing, to be signed by them, or a majority of them,
their verdict on the several charges and specifications contained
in the presentment."
It will be seen that the accused is entitled to a copy of the presentment, not the commission, and to a citation. The court act
alone on the presentment, and the evidence adduced.
Sustaining as we do, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical court,
we might fairly waive any answer to the suggested defects in the
presentment, and rely upon an authority furnished by counselWalker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 486. In that case the motion
was made by the counsel for Walker, that Wainwright, the bishop,
be required to show cause why the injunction previously granted,
restraining the sentence, in accordance with the verdict of an
ecclesiastical court, should not be made absolute. The learned
judge said: " The only cognisance which the court will take of
the case, is to inquire whether there is a want of jurisdiction in
the defendant to do the act which is sought to be restrained. I
cannot consent to review the exercise of any discretion on his part,
or inquire whether his judgment, or that of the subordinate ecclesiastical tribunal, can be justified by the truth of the case. I
cannot draw to myself the duty of revising their action, or of canvassing its manner or foundation, any further than to inquire
whether, according to the law of the association, to which both of
the parties belong, they had authority to act at all. In other
words, I can inquire only whether the defendant has the power to
act, and not whether he is acting rightly.

*

*

*

*

The refusal of the defendant to issue a commission to take testi-
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mony, his refusal to grant a new trial, the alleged, misconduct of
one of the court, are all matters which relate to the mode of procedure, and not to the right to proceed; and I repeat that it is
the latter alone that I can take cognisance of."
The motion was denied and the injunction dissolved.
If we had the right to determine the sufficiency of the presentment, we should hold, as this court has held, in numerous decisions'
in criminal cases, that it is sufficient, if so plainly drawn that the
nature of the offence may be understood. We should not test its
correctness by the strict rules of criminal pleading.
The accused was informed by the presentment that, in his own
church, in the city of Chicago, he had commited the alleged offences. The language is explicit as to their character. The
omissions and alterations are plainly set forth. The place is definitely fixed. No particular day is averred. Was this necessary?
The offences charged are mostly omissions. The rule is: "Where
the offence consisted of an omission, it is not necessary to allege
any time to it;" 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 79. Even in criminal cases
it is not necessary to prove the time precisely as laid. The particular day is not material in point of proof, and is merely a matter
of form: Phillips Ev., vol. 1, 214. This court has decided that
that the allegation of the precise time, even in criminal cases, is
not essential, unless in a few cases; Cebhart v. Adam8, 23 Ill.
399. The presentment avers, as to time, "at divers times during
the two years last past," and "at divers times during the six
months last past." It was insisted, in the argument that, as no
precise day is named, therefore the accused cannot meet the charge
without summoning a large number of witnesses. He would not
be aided by the averment of a particular day. If the presentment
had charged the commission of the offence on a certain day, in
the month of June, A. D. 1867, the prosecution would not, by any
rule of law, have been limited to the day named, but might have
proved the offence-the omission-on any day between the day
named and the date of the presentment. The statute of limitation
would not apply; for the canon has not so provided. The highest
judicature in this church has decided that there is no such law
governing church trials. Bishop Onderdonk was found guilty of
immorality and impurity, committed seven years prior to his trial;
and the Bishops of Louisiana, Rhode Island, Delaware and Arkansas, in their opinion, declared that there was no limitation to

CHASE v. CHENEY.

the inquiry by a church court as to offences, because none had
been fixed and recognised by the canons.
It is inconceivable that the accused could have been surprised
by any vagueness or uncertainty in the charges and specifications.
It is a reasonable presumption that a minister has knowledge of
the constitution of his church and of his acts as such minister
of a public character, and within a recent period, and particularly
his conduct and omissions in the administration of the sacraments
of his church. The bill contains a virtual admission of such
knowledge. The gravamen in the presentment is the omission of
the words "regenerate" and "regeneration" in the ministration
of the sacrament -of infant baptism. The bill has no positive
negation of the omission, but merely avers "that your orator
does not believe himself to have been guilty of offence and misconduct, rendering him liable to trial." The fair construction of
this averment is, "I am guilty of the omission, but this is no
offence which renders me liable to trial." In his affidavit, in support of the bill, the accused said he had informed the bishop that
"he had conscientious scruples in regard to the positive averment
of the regeneration of the baptized infant, by virtue of the act
of baptism only." He further stated, "but this affiant utterly
denies that the omission of the word ' regenerate' from some part
of the said office for infant baptism would constitute any offence
under the canons," &c.
The inference is irresistible that he was informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
The third objection raises the right of challenge; and it is
insisted that this right inheres in every citizen; that the common
law .aid common justice give it. This is true in trials in all
courts organized under the constitution and laws of the land.
This spiritual court was not thus created. It is the creature of
the canons of the church, and by them must be governed, and
by them be judged. Why should we force upon this church judicatory our system without the asking and against its consent?
The canons must control. Section 8 of canon 20 authorizes
the formation of an ecclesiastical tribunal, and directs that the
bishop shall furnish a list of eight presbyters to the accused,
and he shall select not less than three nor more than five from
this list, who shall constitute the court. But if he neglect or
refuse to make a selection the standing committee shall select for
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him. This is the mode adopted, and by implication, excludes all
other modes. Eight persons are presented; three or five might
be rejected without cause, and to this extent a peremptory challenge is allowed."
The minister, in a legal point of view, is a voluntary member
of the association to which he belongs. The position is not
forced upon him; he seeks it. He accepts it with all its burdens
and consequences; with all the rules, and laws, and canons then
subsisting, or to be made by competent authority; and can, at
pleasure, and with impunity abandon it. If they were merciful
and regardful of conscientious scruples, he knew it; if they were
arbitrary, illiberal, and attempted to chain the thoughts and
consciences, he knew it. They cannot, in any event, endanger
his life or liberty; impair any of his personal rights; deprive him
of property acquired under the laws; or interfere with the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship-for
these are protected by the constitution and laws. While a member of the association, however, and having a full share in all the
benefits resulting therefrom, he should adhere to its discipline;
conform to its doctrines and mode of worship; and obey its laws
and canons. If reason and conscience will not permit, the connection should be severed. "The only remedy which the member
of a voluntary association has, when he is dissatisfied with the
proceedings of the body with which he is connected, is to withdraw from it :" .orbes v. Eden, Law Rep. 1 S. & D. App. 568.
If we compel this spiritual court to observe the rule of law as
to challenge of jurors, it would be our duty to enforce the
observance of all the rules of law, unless of impossible application. With the same propriety it might be urged that twelve
presbyters-the number of a jury-instead of three or five,
should form the court. Why not go beyond the pale of the
church, and abandon the presbyters as wholly incompetent? The
canon in the designation of presbyters as assessors, and the number is no more emphatic than in providing the manner of selection. What law shall govern as to the number of witnesses
necessary to establish an offence? Our law only requires one
witness, with two exceptions; the scriptural rule requires two.
The injunction of St. Paul is, "Against an elder receive not an
accusation, but before two or three witnesses." The law under
the old dispensation was: "One witness shall not rise up against
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a man for any iniquity, or for any sin; at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be
established."
We have no right, and, therefore, will not exercise the power
to dictate ecclesiastical law. We do not aspire to become de facto
heads of the church, and by construction or otherwise, abrogate
its laws and canons. We shall not inquire whether the alleged
omission is any offence. This is a question of ecclesiastical
cognisance. This is no forum for such adjudication. The church
should guard its own fold; enact and construe its own laws;
enforce its own discipline; and thus will be maintained the boundary between the temporal and spiritual power.
As to the fourth objection, that the notice for trial was insufficient, we have only to say, this comes too late. The party was
present, and made no pretence that he had not had time to prepare for trial. As an allegation in the bill it is too frivolous to
be considered.
But it is said that the civil rights of the Rev. Mr. Cheney are
involved in this controversy; that the office of a clergyman is
one of public concern; that he has vested rights in it; that the
right to preach is in itself property, and that attached to the office
in question are salary and emoluments. Has the party in this
case any vested right to the rectorship of Christ Church, and as a
necessary consequence to the profits and perquisites? No parish
can form a part of the diocese of Illinois, unless with the consent
of the bishop and the formation of a constitution, as provided iii
canon eight, by which it "accedes to, recognises and adopts the
constitution, canons, doctrines, discipline and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church." The minister, having been previously
ordained, and pledged to conformity to the rules and doctrines of
the church, is installed as rector, according to canon ten, by the
production of. the proper certificates from the bishop. The vestry
is required, by canon twelve, to obtain the amount stipulated for his
support by "the gathering of offering in divine service, or by the
procurement and collection of subscriptions, or of pew rents." It
would be a mockery of language to say the agreement for a salary,
thus made, constituted a vested right-a right which could not
be suspended. The salary depended upon the continued performance of the duties of rector. The contract must be construed
and enforced by reference to the canons which form a part of it.
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If the minister was suspended or deposed for any ecclesiastical
offence, the payment would cease. The case of the -DutchChurch
of Albany v. Bradford, 8 Cowen 457, confirms this view. An
action was brought by the minister to recover a portion of his salary. He had been only suspended, and insisted that his salary
continued until the dissolution of the connection. In the Court
of Errors, on a reversal of the decision of the Supreme Court, it
was held that he was not entitled to his salary between the sentence of suspension and dissolution; and that as he-did not, and
could not, perform his ministerial duties, he could not recover his
salary. The record in the case at bar discloses no contract which
we can construe, except by reference to the canons.
It is also claimed, that there is value in the right to pursue any
lawful avocation. Of this we entertain no doubt. We have no
doubt, either, of the absolute right of every citizen, under our
constitution, to teach and preach the gospel to whomsoever will
listen. But in an organized church, with written or printed rules
and established doctrines and mode of worship, the right is qualified. The continuance, powers and emoluments of the position
depend upon the will of the church. The right is contingent and
restricted, and as a thing of value is very much lessened. The
sentence of a church judicatory, in a proper case, deprives of the
position, and salary and emoluments are gone. In this unhappy
controversy is involved a grave question, and of deeper'moment
to all Christian men-indeed to all men who believe that Christianity, pure and simple, is the fairest system of morals, the firmest
prop to our government, the chiefest reliance in this life, and the
life to come. Shall we maintain the boundary between church
and state, and let each revolve in its respective sphere, the one
undisturbed bty the other? All history warns not to rouse the
passion or wake up the fanaticism which may grapple ;with the
state in a deathly struggle for supremacy.
Our constitution provides that the "free exercise and enjoyment
of religious professions, and worship, without discrimination, shall
for ever be guaranteed." In ecclesiastical law, profession means
the act of entering into a, religious order. Religious worship consists in the performance of all the external acts and the observance
of all ordinances and ceremonies, which are engaged in with the
sole and avowed object of honoring God. The constitution intended to guarantee from all interference by the state, not only
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each man's religious faith, but his membership in the church, and
the rights and discipline which might be adopted. The only exception to uncontrolled liberty is, that acts of licentiousness shall
not be excused, and practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state shall not be justified. Freedom of religious
profession'and worship cannot be maintained if the civil courts
trench upon the domains of the church-construe its canons and
rules-dictate its discipline and regulate its trials. The larger
portion of the Christian world has always recognised the truth
of the declaration: "A church without discipline must become,
if not already, a church without religion." It is as much a delusion to confer religious liberty without the right to make and
enforce rules and canons, as to create government with no power
to punish offenders. The constitution guarantees the free " exercise and enjoyment." This implies not alone the practice but
the " possession with satisfaction"-not alone the exercise, but
the exercise coupled with enjoyment. This "1free exercise and
enjoyment" must be as each man and each voluntary association
of- men may determine. The civil power may contribute to the
protection, but cannot interfere to destroy or fritter away.
The civil courts will interfere with churches, or religious associations, when rights of property or civil rights are involved.
But they will not revise the decisions of such associations upon
ecclesiastical matters, merely to ascertain their jurisdiction. As
we understand the, position of the defendant in error, his civil
rights are not so endangered as to require our interposition. It
may not be improper to collate some of the authorities which bear
upon this question. The controlling principle is declared in the
24th statutes of Henry VIII. : "Causes spiritual must be judged
by judges of the spirituality, and causes temporal by temporal
judges." In Baptist Chureh v. Witherell, 8 Paige 296, the chancellor said: "Over the church, as such, the legal tribunals do not
profess to have any jurisdiction whatever, except to protect the
civil rights of others and preserve the public peace. All questions relating to the faith and practice of the church, and its
members, belong to the church judicatories to which they have
voluntarily subjected themselves. In Lawyer v. Capperly, 7
Paige 281, it is said: "the church, as to its doctrines, govern'ment and worship, is to be governed by its peculiar rulers." In
the case of aable v. Miller, 10 Paige 627, the learned chancellor
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doubted the soundness of his former decision, but his decree was
reversed by the highest court in the state, by a vote of fourteen to
three. Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492. The same principle is enunciated in .obertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64; and -Diffendorf v.
Ref. Cal. Church, 20 John. 12. In the case of the German Bef.

Church v. Seibert, 3 Barr 291, it is said: "The decisions of ecclesiastical courts are final, as they are the best judges of what
constitutes an offence against the word of God and the discipline
of the church." The Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in Shannon
v. Frost, 3 B. Monroe 258, says: "This court, having no ecclesiastical jurisdiction, cannot revise ordinary acts of church
discipline or excision."
In a recent case .Forbes v. .Eden, Law Rep. 1 Scotch & Div.
Appeals 568, decided in 1867, the Rev. Mr. Forbes alleged
that he could not, conscientiously, obey certain canons; and that,
as a consequence, he might be degraded from his office of minister,
and be deprived of temporal advantages. The Ld. Chancellor said:
"Appellant does not allege any actual damage, * * * but founds

his action upon a possibility of damage hereafter," and that "it
was a mere abstract question involving religious dogmas, and resulting in no civil consequences which would justify the interposition of a civil court." Lord CILANWORTH said: "There is no
authority in the courts to take cognisance of the rules of a voluntary society

*

*

*

*

* save only so far as it may be

necessary for the due disposal and administration of property."
Lord COLONSAY said: "A court of law will not interfere with the

rules of a voluntary association, unless it is necessary to do so to
protect some civil right." In aartenv. Penick, in the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, 9 Am. Law Reg. 210, Judge ROBERTSON,
who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "Christianity, though
an essential element of conservatism, and a great moral power in
the state, should only work by love, and inscribe the laws of
liberty and light on the heart; and the civil government has no,
just or lawful power over the conscience, or faith, or form of
worship, or church creeds, or discipline, as long as their fruits
neither unhinge civil supremacy, demoralize society, nor disturb
its peace or security." In reference to church members he said:
"They joined the church with a knowledge of its defined powers,
and, as the civil power cannot interfere in matters of conscience,
-VOL. XIM.-20
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of faith, or discipline, they must submit to rebuke or excommunication, however unjust, by their adopted spiritual rulers."
In the only case in this court in which this question has been
adverted to, the court says: "Whilst we will decide nothing affecting the ecclesiastical right of a church, which we are not
competent to do, its civil rights to property are subjects for our
examination, to be determined in conformity to the laws of the
land,- and the principles of equity ;" Ferrariv. Jrasconcelles, 36
Ill. 46.
There are some authorities in favor of interference, but the
cases collated declare the law as we think it ought to be. We
have been referred to numerous cases in Massachusetts. The
constitution of that state, from 1780 to 1833, made it the duty
of the legislature to "require the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic, 'or religious societies, to make
suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution of the
public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of
public protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality, in all
cases where such provisions shall not be made voluntarily :"
Constitution of Massachusetts, part 1, art. 3. Laws were passed
for the purpose contemplated, and an ecclesiastical law has thus
grown up there. These decisions are not applicable in this state,
as legislative and judicial interference in such matters is expressly
forbidden by the constitution, which all are bound to obey.
This case may then be briefly summed up: A rector in the
church is charged with non-conformity to its doctrines-intentional omissions in the ministration of its ordinances; and the attempt is made to organize a court, composed of his brother clergymen, for his trial. He appeals to the civil court, and alleges, as
the chief reason for interposition, the want of authority in the
spiritual court to try him, and a misconstruction of the canons.
The same point was made to that court, and its power denied.
It was urged with the same earnestness, and enforced with the
same arguments there as here. That court overruled the objections and decided that it had jurisdiction. Five intelligent clergymen in the church, presumed to be deeply versed in biblical and
canonical lore, were more competent than this court to decide the
peculiar questions raised; why should we review that and not
every other decision which involves the interpretation of the
canons ? It is conceded that when jurisdiction attaches, the judg-
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ment of the church court is conclusive as to purely ecclesiastical
offences. It should be equally conclusive upon doubtful and
technical questions, involving a criticism of the canons, even
though they might comprise jurisdictional facts. It requires
no more intellect, information or honesty to decide what is an
ecclesiastical offence than to determine the authority of the court
according to the canons. The distinction is without a difference.
Civil courts have duties and responsibilities devolved upon
them, and a well-defined jurisdiction to maintain. The church
has more solemn duties, more weighty responsibilities, and an
authority granted by the Infinite Author of all things. We shall
not enter in and "light up her temple from unhallowed fire."
The ministers selected to sit in judgment on the acts of a brother
ought to be impartial and competent, prompted, as they doubtless are, by the teachings of divine revelation, and the kindly
influences of Christian charity, which suffereth long and is kind;
beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth
all things.
Having given this case a most careful consideration, our deliberate judgment is that the ec'clesiastical court ought not to be
restrained by the mandate of this court.
The decree of the Superior Court is reversed, and the bill dismissed.
LAWRENCE, C. J., and SHELDON, J.-We concur in the decision
of the case at bar announced in the foregoing opinion, and we
also concur in the opinion itself, except as to one principle therein. We understand the opinion as implying that, in the administration of ecclesiastical discipline, and where there is no other
right of property involved than the loss of the clerical office or
salary as an incident to such discipline, a spiritual court is the
exclusive judge of its own jurisdiction, under the laws or canons
of the religious association to which it belongs, and its decision
of that question is binding upon secular courts. This is a principle of so grave a character that, believing it to be erroneous,
we are constrained to express our dissent upon the record.
We concede that when a spiritual court has once been organized in conformity with the rules of the denomination of which
it forms a part, and when it has jurisdiction of the parties and
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the subject-matter, its subsequent action in the administration of
spiritual discipline will not be revised by the secular courts.
The simple reason is that the association is purely voluntary, and
when a person joins it, he consents that for all spiritual offences,
he will be tried by a tribunal organized in conformity with the laws
of the society. But he has not consented that he will be tried by
one not so organized; and when a clergyman is in danger of
being degraded from his office, and losing his salary and means
of livelihood, by the action -of a spiritual court unlawfully constituted, we are very clearly of opinion he may come to the secular courts for protection. It would be the duty of such courts
to examine the -question of jurisdiction, without regard to the
decision of the spiritual court itself; and if they find such tribunal has been organized in defiance of the laws of the association,
and is exercising a merely usurped and arbitrary power, they
should furnish such protection as the laws of the land will give.
We consider this position clearly sustainable upon principles
and authority.
The foreguig opinion, so far as the
merits of Mr. Cheney's bill are concerned, seems to be entirely satisfactory
and conclusive. It would scarcely seem
possible that he could himself have expected to succeed, except upon the
ground that all which was charged
against him, and the commission of
which he virtually concedes, constituted
no offence upon a fair construction of
the canons of his church. This conclusion he may have reached, no doubt, by
resort to first principles, and thus virtually reasoning from a standpoint outside of the church of which he was
acting as an accredited minister. And
this is the fundamental fallacy upon
which all this class of men seem to
argue :-If a thing is, in itself, reasonable and just, that one is at liberty to do
it, although prohibited by the very letter
of the law to which he has promised
obedience. This is the essence, and the
absurdity, of what has been called "the
higher law." It is virtually setting up
one's own will and judgment, under the

sobriquet of conscience, against the
plain letter of the written law. That
this was really Mr. Cheney's case there
would seem to be no other proof needed,
than a brief recurrence to the frivolous
character of the other alleged irregularities in the organization and I~rocedure
of the ecclesiastical court, which must
have been introduced as a mere setting
for this real gravamen of his case. 1st.
He complains that the commission of the
Bishop to the Presenters was irregular
and therefore void, and chiefly because
it recited u ground of the bishop's information in regard to the offence of
Mr. Cheney, not named in the canons.
There was no necessity of any commission; none was required by the canons.
All that was required was, that presenters should be in some way designated
by the bishop, to examine the reputed
offence, and, if well founded, present it
for trial. The offender was in no way
implicated or entitled to be consulted
until after presentment. This objection,
therefore, was analogous to a motion in
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a criminal court to quash an indictment
upon the ground of some defect or informality in the venire for the grand
jury. And the other alleged irregularities are scarcely more deserving of
serious consideration. No fair-minded
man can possibly believe the omission
of time and place in the charge of such
an offence in an ecclesiastical court
could be held fatal to the presentment.
If required in a formal indictment in
offences consisting of mere omissions, it
is the merest form, affording no security,
or information, to the accused whatever,
since the offence may always be proved
to have been committed on any other
day, within the Statute of Limitations,
and at any other place within the body
of the county. And the other objections
seem mostly of the same futile and frivolous character. It seems scarcely
credible that Mr. Cheney, or any one
else, could seriously pretend to believe
in the same right of challenge of his
triers, in an ecclesiastical court, which
be would have in a secular court of
criminal jurisdiction. We think this is
the first case where any such extensive
application of the principles of Magna
Charta, obthe Petition, or Bill of Rights,
has ever been claimed. The claim that
notice of the trial was insufficient and
that the whole proceeding should be declared void on that account, after the
accused had appeared and submitted his
exceptions to the court, is very properly
declared by the court "too frivolous to
be considered." This disposes of all
grounds upon which the injunction is
attempted to be maintained, except that
the facts charged constituted no offence.
This, we have no doubt, both Mr. Cheney and his friends and supporters, sincerely and religidusly believed; and if
the bill had been based upon this sole
ground, it could not have failed to excite
deep sympathy on his behalf in all
liberal and earnest minds; a sentiment
which sooner or later cannot but pene-

trate the double mail of old centuries
Ritualism in this country and everywhere. We say this with all respect
and veneration for the Church of England aud the American branch of it, to
which no man renders a more willing or
ardent devotion than ourselves.
But will this,change the law and jus-tify the civil courts in usurping the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical tribunals
throughout the land? If so, the church
in America is subjected to an arbitrary
and irresponsible oppression and tyranny
at the hands of the state, which exists
nowhere in Europe, either among Protestants or Romanists. For in all those
countries ecclesiastical causes are tried,
in the main, by ecclesiastical judges,
and the decisions respected by the secular courts. There indeed is in England
a prerogative supervision over all the
judicial tribunals in the kingdom exercised by the Court of Queen's Bench.
But this supervision only extends to
actions through such writs as Prohibition, or Procedendo, and Mandamus in
some instances; none of which assume
to control the action of any inferior
court, temporal or spiritual, within their
appropriate jurisdiction, but only to
keep them within such jurisdiction, and
secure the proper action in the proper
time. And that was really the remedy
which Mr. Cheney's case seemed to require, provided there was no case against
him. But no English Court of Chancery would ever presume to issue an
injunction against the members of an
ecclesiastical court, any more than they
would presume to direct Parliament or
the Crown in the performance of their
duty. But, very naturally, Mr. Cheney
supposed he ought to have some mode
of trying the validity of the proceedings
against him, before some civil tribunal,
and not be left entirely at the mercy of
an ecclesiastical court, which is proverbially influenced more by prejudice
and passion than any other species of
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judicial tribunal. This is not, of course,
attributable to any want of good principle or wisdom in the judges, so much
as to the controversial and partisan
nature of the causes, and the want of
judicial training and experience among
the members of such courts-many of
whom never act as judges in any court
more than once in their lives. And we
are free to say that we believe Mr.
Cheney is right in his contention that
he has rights of property involved in
this controversy, which cannot finally
be disposed of by the decree of the ecclesiastical court without some power of
revision by the secular tribunals. But
it seems to us that he resorted to an
altogether inadequate and unsuitable
remedy. The writ of injunction out of
chancery is never applied to the control
of the action or jurisdiction of other
courts, but only to the action of the
parties in a controversy. And there is
no occasion axd no propriety in a resort
to this remedy except to save some irreparable mischief. But in Mr. Cheney's
case, if his contention is well founded,
that he has committed no offence against
the laws of the church, he is in no peril ;
and if he is guilty, the sooner he is convicted the better. His conviction by the
ecclesiastical court of what is no offence,
even if it be declared an offence by that
court, will not make it so, provided the
facts charged do not constitute an offence,
or if the court have no jurisdiction,
either of the offence or the party, or if
the proceedings are not in conformity
with the requirements of the ecclesiastical law. But these questions cannot
be determined by any secular court, In
advance of the decision of the ecclesiastical court.* For it cannot be known
how they will proceed and what they
will decide, until the procedure is accomplished and the decision made. The
fact that the ecclesiastical court is proceeding irregularly at a particular time
is no ground of certain inference that it

will continue in the same course to the
end, and then enter a wrongful judgment. But if all this does occur no
irreparable mischief is inflicted. The
ecclesiastical court possesses none of the
prerogatives of a civil court. No verity
attaches to its decrees or records as evidence. They must all be proved by
testimony ore tenus in a civil court, and
are liable to contradiction and explanation the same as the award of a committee of a voluntary society, or of
arbitrators chosen by the parties. We
are all liable to misconception and misapprehension in regard to the functions
of ecclesiastical tribunals in this country, from the fact that they are called
" courts," and the supposed analogy
existing between such courts and the
English ecclesiastical courts. But, in
fact, an ecclesiastical court in this country has no status, as a court, except
what is conferred by the consent of the
members of the church or association,
and as to them alone. It is the same as
any other voluntary society or organization whatever, of which the civil courts
will assume no control, and of whose
decrees they will take no cognisance,
except as they are relied npon by the
parties to civil controversies, in establishing their rights in the secular courts.
It need scarcely be said that no court
of equity would ever listen to an application to enjoin the proceedings of arbitrators, or of a committee of a voluntary
society, on the ground that they were
proceeding irregularly and without authority, or with unfairness and partiality.
It will be time enough to raise these
questions after the final action of such
bodies is reached, in attempting to enforce their awards.
This seems to have been all that was
legitimately involved in Mr. Cheney's
bill, and the Supreme Court might have
decided the case upon this narrow view,
that the proceeding was premature, and
afforded no ground for an injunction out
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of chancery. But the great interest felt
in the controversy, and the extended
arguments of counsel in the case,
naturally led to the attempt, on the part
of the court, to establish some general
rules of law, which might control future
cases, and this case in particular. In
this attempt, if we comprehend the views
of the majority of the court, it does not
seem to us they have been equally fortunate as in the other portions of the
opinion; and we are confirmed in this
view from hearing the general complaint
of the difficulties of others in regard to
the same subject, and especially of the
dissenting members of the court. The
judges were all agreed that the bill for
an injunction could not be maintained;
and to this extent the opinion is lucid
and able and entirely satisfactory. But
beyond this it can scarcely be regarded
as putting forth views likely to be deferred to as authority even in that state,
and certainly not elsewhere. And it
seems to us that in two or three import-ant particulars it puts forth views which
can scarcely be maintained anywhere.
1. That Mr. Cheney has no pecuniary
interest at stake in the matter ; nothing
which %ay fairly be regarded as property which the civil courts will protect.
It seems to us, that in every view Mr.
Cheney has a very important and valuable interest at issue in this very controversy, and one that the civil courts will
protect, in all proper modes, but certainly not by way of injunction out of
chancery. If Mr. Cheney is suspended
from exercising the functions of his
ministry and he chooses to institute civil
proceedings for the recovery of his
salary or any other valuable right
affected by such decree of suspension,
and that decree is interposed by way of
defence, the civil court will, as we
understand the law, examine the entire
proceeding, from beginning to end, the
same as if an award of arbitrators were
relied upon, as having terminated his

relation of rector of the church. And
in that view, before the parties, relying
upon the decree of the ecclesiastical
court, can derive any benefit from it, by
way of defence, it must appear that the
court was organized in conformity with
the laws of the church; that it had,
according to the laws of that body, jurisdiction both of the subject-matter of the
offence and of the person of the accused,
and that the procedure and final decree
were also substantially in conformity to
those laws.
2. We must therefore conclude that
the question of the jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical court, both of the subjectmatter of the controversy and of the
person of the party, is always open;
and that the decision of that court in
regard to either of these questions is not
conclusive. This question is so clearly
settled, both upon principle and authority, that it scarcely seems requisite to
examine it much in detail. There can
be no qiaestion, we apprehend, that an
ecclesiastical court must be considered
one of special and limited jurisdiction.
Few courts are more so. But it is too
well settled to admit of debate or to require the citation of authority, that
nothing will be presumed in favor of the
jurisdiction of any court of the class
just named. If such a court be a domestic one, whose judgments can only
appear by its record, the jurisdiction of
the court, both in regard to the subjectmatter and the parties, must appear upon
the record. And unless it do so appear
the judgment cannot be upheld.
But we suppose it must further be conceded in regard to ecclesiastical courts,
in this country, that they must, as to the
civil tribunals of the state or nation;,
stand upon the same basis as foreign
courts. No verity attaches to the records
of any such court. There is no mode
in which such record can be rhade evidence unless by special statute. Such
courts are not courts of record so as
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to enable them to authenticate their
judgments or decrees by way of record.
The whole proceedings of the court
are matters resting in pais, so that
everything necessary to give validity to
the judgment must be shown by oral
proof. And being a court of special
and limited jurisdiction and foreign to
the recognised judicial tribunals of the
country, it must be shown that the court
was properly constituted under the
canons. We do not mean by this that
every minute and technical formality
must be strictly and literally complied
with in the constituting of the court, but
only in substance. For instance, if the
.canon required three presenters, two
will not be able to act. And so of the
selection of the assessors, one or two or
four could not act when three or five are
required. It must also be affirmatively
shown that the court had jurisdiction,
both of the subject-matter and of the
parties, which is but an extension of the
requirement that the court be properly
constituted under the canons. It must
also appear that the trial was bond fide;
exempt from fraud or partiality; and
substantially in conformity with the
canons.
This is now entirely well settled by
the English decisions as to foreign judgments, and must clearly apply to ecclesiastical courts in this country. In
Bank of Australia v. Nias, 16 Q. B.
717, it is decided, on full consideration,
that a foreign or colonial judgment is
impeachable, by showing want of jurisdiction, or that the party was not served
with process, or that the same was unfairly or fraudulently obtained. And
substantially the same is held in Ricardo
v. Garcias, 12 Cl. & Fin. 368. Other
cases might be cited, but they will be
found digested in 2 Story Eq. Ju.
15,
76, et seq.; Story Confl. Laws,
618a-618k. But such judgments are
conclusive upon the merits, when not
impeached for any of the reasons alluded

to, as much so as a domestic judgment.
And we apprehend the same rules will
apply to the judgments of ecclesiastical
courts in this country. After showing
that they are properly constituted, and
have full jurisdiction, and proceed regularly and fairly in the trial, it would
certainly not be competent for a civil
court to declare that the evidence was
insufficient or the finding erroneons or the
construction of the canons misconceived.
But if important and competent evidence
on the part of the accused were rejected,
or possibly if an absurd construction of
the canons adopted, or any other unjust
and partial course pursued to bring
about the conviction, it could not be
upheld. We suppose, too, that if the
ecclesiastical court should attempt to
pursue the rules of the common law, or
of the canon law, either in regard to
the admission of evidence or the construction of the canons or the definition
of the offence charged, and in such
attempt should misconceive the law
which they attempted to pursue, and
thus be led to a different result from
what they would otherwise have reached,
this would render any judgment they
might give, under such misapprehension,
of no force or validity. That is a wellsettled rule, as to the award of referees
and arbitrators, and we see no reason
why it does not apply, with equal force,
to the decrees of these voluntary and
friendly societies, when they attempt to
create courts for the settlement of disputes or the enforcement of discipline
among their members. But we may
naturally suppose that the secular courts
will be backward in disregarding the
action of the ecclesiastical courts, in
matters of ecclesiastical cognisance,
mainly upon the ground of misconception of the law.
We cannot forbear to say, in conclusion, that it seems to us the civil law
allows Mr. Cheney a wide range for
impeaching the decree of the ecclesias-
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tical court, in his case, if it should
finally be rendered against him, as he
seems to apprehend, possibly not without
reason. But if he has come to feel so
little respect for the ritual of his church,
as his course seems to indicate, he will
suffer the less deprivation in leaving it,
and attempting to do his work outside,
which would seem to be the only safe
and proper place for one entertaining
his views.
The subject is very learnedly discussed
and the authorities very extensively
quoted by HAND, J., in Robertson v.
Bullions, 9 Barb. 64, in an opinion extending over more than fifty pages.
The principle of the decision is expressed
in the head-note thus: The civil courts
cannot, upon the merits, overhaul the
decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories,
in matters properly within their province. See also Baptist Church v. Witherell, 3 Paige 296; Gable v. Miller, 10
Id. 627 ; 9. c., 2 Denio 492.
The Supreme Court of New York, in
The People v. Steele, 2 Barb. Sup. Ct.
Rep. 397, on the authority mainly of
Rex v. Barker, 3 Burrows 1265, put out
one minister and put another into the
possession of the church and parsonage,
where the church authority had so decreed. But that case has been questioned
in the case of Robertson v. Bullions,
supra, citing The People v. Stevens, 5
Hill 616. Robertson v. Bullioits was a
proceeding in equity, and both courts
held that the temporalties of the church
could not be applied to the support of a
minister who had been suspended from
the exercise of his ministry by the
church authorities.
The subject is very learnedly discussed
in Wason v. Avery, 2 Bush 332-398,

and this case fully sustains the views we
have presented in this note. The conclusive effect of church authority within
its sphere is fully recognised in Sutterv.
Dutch Reformed Church, 42 Penna. St.
503. In German Reformed Church v.
Seibert, 3 Id. 282, the court held, that
the decisions of ecclesiastical courts,
like those of every other judicial tribunal, are final, as they are the best
judges of what constitutes an offence
against the word of God and the discipline of the church. Until a final
adjudication is had in the church judicatories the relator is without remedy
by mandamus. Id. In Smith v. Nelson,
18 Vt. 511, Chief Justice WxLLIAs
gave a very able and learned opinion in
favor of the view, that the decisions of
church judicatories in that state arc not
to be regarded as of any particular
weight, in determining the pecuniary
rights of parties in the secular courts,
any further than their wisdom and justice commend them to acceptance by
those tribunals. We greatly fear, that
tried by this test, few of them would
meet with much favor. For, so far as
we remember, in this country, the most
important ecclesiastical trials, like trials
for impeachment of civil officers, have
been characterized by great want of impartial justice and fair dealing, and
deeply imbued with a spirit of bitterness
and malevolence. It is natural they
should be so, since they are commonly
stimulated by one party in the church
against another, and have more reference
to success than either mercy or justice.
We have discussed these questions somewhat in detail, .ante, vol. 9, N. S.
220-225.
I. F. R.

The opinion of the majority of the
court seems to enunciate a rule probably
never heretofore laid down, that the decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories or
of those claiming to be such, are not

only conclusive when jurisdiction attaches, but equally so as to the existence
and extent of jurisdiction. It is indeed
declared, that the distinction between
the assumption of jurisdiction and the
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conclusiveness of action when jurisdiction has obtained, is a distinction without a difference. We believe it has been
generally supposed, that when the act of
any authority whatever is pleaded before
a civil cottrt, as the basis of a civil right,
the court may inquire and determine as
to the jurisdiction of that authority, the
action of which is thus brought under
review.
1 1. If the conclusion announced in the
principal case be correct, it is difficult to
see why it would not control in questions
of church property4 for though such questions might arise between those not parties to the immediate acts of discipline,
yet acquiescence in or disobedience to
such acts, may readily enough furnish
the very ground of controversy.
But it is no longer an open question
that civil tribunals will interfere "when
rights of property or civil rights are involved." And civil tribunals, as is well
remarked by Mr. Inues in his valuable
treatise on the "Law of Creeds in Scotland" (p. 323), "have no means of doing justice, except by investigating into
the differences of doctrine, discipline, or
practice-which to the litigants may be
religious differences, but to the judge
are mere matters of fact bearing upon a
question of civil right."
But upon what principle can the unbroken line of authority to this effect, be
sustained, if there be no difference between the finality of a finding on jurisdictional facts and upon the merits ?
2. Non-established churches are merelyvoluntary associations founded on contract. Their constitutions, canons, rules
and regulations are the stipulations between the parties. Tribunals may be
established by agreement, for the enforcement of discipline, but they are
limited by the terms of such agreement
and must proceed as therein specified,
and substantially in accordance with the
law of the land and the principles of
justice. They have no "jurisdiction,"

properly speaking, for that implies the
existence of a power conferred by the
state and vested in functionaries sanctioned for that purpose by the state, but
that which for convenience may be so
termed, entirely dependent upon the contract, and which never precludes the fullest investigation by the civil courts in a
proper case, arising upon the action of
such voluntary tribunals, and the administration of such relief as upon the
facts appears appropriate and necessary.
These are the views expressed in
Long v. The Bishop of Capetown, 1
Moore Priv. C. C. (N. S.) 411, 461, in
which it is held that the decisions of
such tribunals will only be binding,
when they have acted within the scope
of their authority, and have proceeded
in a manner consonant with the principles of justice, including "that strict
impartiality, necessary to be observed by
all tribunals, however little fettered by
forms.'
And to the same purport is the elaborateopinion of Ld. ROMILLY in Bishopof
Natal v. Gladstone,L. R. 8 Eq. 1 (1866),
his lordship deciding that the action of a
colonial bishop when in excess of his
authority, or not consonant with the
principles of justice, must be held void.
So in McMillan v. The Free Church of
Scotland, 22 Court Sessions (N. S.) 290,
the court say: "ut whatsoever contract they may form, certainly no more
than any other contracting parties, whether an association or individuals, will
they be able to exclude the ordinary
civil jurisdiction of this court to decide
between the members : 1st. *Whether
such contract does really exist or not?
2d. What is the true measure and meaning of that contract? And 3d. *What
is the construction and interpretatifn to
be put on any one or more of its particular clauses and provisions about which
the members of the body are at variance ?" And it is held that as to whatever is beyond the stipulated action of
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the contract, the court will undoubtedly
maintain its jurisdiction. And in the
second judgment in the same case (23
Ct. Sess. (N. S.) 1314), it is declared
that the court will interfere where
churches are proceeding in violation of
their own constitutions and "their sentences are pronounced by those who are
not judicatories to that effect." See also
ffurray v. Burgers, 4 Moore's P. C. C.
(N. S.) 250 ; In re Lord Bishop of Natal,
3 Id. 115 ; Dunbar v. Skinner, 11 Court
Sess. (N. S.) 945.
These cases, not arising in the "Established Church," will be found applicable to those in this country. Indeed,
in the first Auchterarder case, which
involved the proceedings of a Scottish
presbytery.anJ other governing bodies
in the Presbyterian Church, the broad
principle is stated by Lord BnOUGHAx,
that "when any proceeding of a church
court, however strictly ecclesiastical in
its own nature, affects a civil right, that
proceeding in its whole extent, falls under
the cognisance of the courts of law :"
Presb. of Auct. v. Kinnoull, 6 Clark &
F. 646 ; Fergusonv. Kinnoull, 9 Id. 251.
To the same effect substantially is Forbes
v. Eden, L. R. I Sc. & D. App. 568,
in which, however, neither actual damage nor the impending danger of any,
was alleged: see s. c. 4 Ct. Sess. (3d
Series) 157.
Similar conclusions have been reached
in this country. It has been uniformly
held that the judgments of ecclesiastical
organizations are only binding when arrived at in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the particular church, and
conducted regularly, bondfide, and with
impartiality. To hold otherwise would
be to yield to tribunals uncreated by
law, the supremacy over those to whom
the administration of law is committed.
It would be, in the language of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, to subject all
individual and property rights confided
in or dedicated to the use of religious

organizations, to the arbitrarywill of
those who may constitute their judicatories, without regard to any of the regulations or constitutional restraints by
which it was intended such rights should
be protected: Watson v. Avery, 2 Bush
336. In Smith v. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, it
is said that "the proceedings of any
self-constituted ecclesiastical tribunal,
not recognised as a part of our jurisprudence, may be examined, disregarded,
and declared void, whenever the subject
comes before our courts of law, whether
directly or collaterally."
The Supreme Court of 'ennsylvania
in Commonwealth v. Green, 4 Whart. 603,
in reviewing the proceedings of the Presbyterian General Assembly says: "'We
have, as already remarked, no authority
to adjudge its judgments on their merits.
We are to determine only what was
done; the reasons of those who did it,
are immaterial. If the acts complained
of were within the jurisdictionof the Assembly, their decision must be final,
though they decided wrong." And again:
"Had the excluded synods been cut'off
by a judicial sentence, without hearing or
notice, the act would have been contrary
to the cardinal principles of natural justice, and consequently void." And the
same court in Green v. African Meth.
Epis. Church, I S. & R. 254, restored
the relator to his "standing" as a member, overruling the action of the society
in that regard.
So in Runkle v. linemuller, 4 Har."
& MeHen. 429, the relator was restored
to his "place and function" as a minister of the German Reformed Church,
upon able argument (Pinkney for the
writ; Harpercontr&) against the interference of the court. See also Brosiusv.
Reuter, 1 H. & J. 551 ; Thompson v. Reh.
Cong. Soc., 7 Pick. 160; Boston Law
Rep. Dec. 1855, 427, and cases cited.
Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Monroe 257, frequently cited to sustain the opposite position, is not adverse, as the case arose
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in a Baptist church, which had no constitution and acknowledged no ecclesiastical authority, the voice of the majority of the congregation being of necessity the voice of the church. So Seibert's
Case, 3 Barr 291, turned upon the fact
that the suitor had not exercised the
right of appeal, the court holding that it
was time enough to invoke their aid,
when he had exhausted the remedies secured to him by the law of the church.
. This subject received an examination
by that distinguished commentator Judge
REDvIELD, in a note to. Gartin v. Pen-

nicki 9 Am. Law Reg. 210; and he,
though dissenting from the conclusion
of the court below in the principal case,
nevertheless arrives at practically the
same result as that above stated. He
says that " it is like the ease of a reference or arbitration. The submission,
whether immediate or remote, whether by
a contract for the express purpose or by a
contract of membership, is all the same,
but in some way it must be proved."
And again, the action of churches must
be treated, when "according to their
own constitutions and canons, as binding
the members, so long as the proceedings
are regular and bon4 fide. If not, they
will not, of course, bind any one, and
whether they have been so, is always
open to inquiry, as-matter of evidence in
pais, the same as in regard to an arbitration or a foreign judgment."
It is well established that awards will
be set aside when ultra vires: Strong v.
Strong, 9 Cush. 560, 34 Vermont 121 ;
for misbehavior, Speer v. Bidwell, 44 Pa.
26 ; for prejudgment, Taber v. Jenny, 1
Sprague 320; and for partiality, however honest in intention, Sullivan v.
Frink, 3 Clarke (Iowa) 66 ; Strong v.
Strong, 12 Cashing 135, Same v. Same,
9 Id. 560.
Careful research fails to disclose a single authority in this country to sustain
the position that civil courts are precluded from action by the conclusive cha-

racter of ecclesiastical determinations.
And throughout the British Empire the
correctness of the language of Lord
CAMPDELL in the second Auchterarder
case, is universally conceded, that "from
the time of St. Thomas A'Becket till
now, there has been no such pretension
in any part of this island as that ecclesiastics, in the exercise of a liberum arbitrium inherent in them, are of their own
authority, conclusively to define and declare their own power and jurisdiction,
and that no civil tribunal can call in
question the validity of the acts or proceedings of any ecclesiastical courts."
II. Interference has been in some instances placed upon grounds of public
policy: Rex v. Barker, 3 Burrows 1266 ;
Runkle v. Winemuller, 4 Har. & McH.
429 ; and it might under certain circumstances be justified upon the same principles as those invoked for the protection
of the right of membership in other associations: 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. 8.) 533;
but the question in the principal case
was considered to be, does the deprivation of a clergyman involte civil or ploperty rights of his own, which he can
protect by resort to the tribunals created
by the superior power of the state to pass
upon rights of that character ?"
The right to pursue a particular means
of livelihood is, of itself, property: Ex
parte Cummings, 4 Wallace 277; Exparte
Garland,Id. 333 ; In re Dorsey, 7 Porter
381. And to the office in question salary and emoluments are attached, there
being practically no distinction between
"the benefice in English law and the
right of a minister to the salary and emoluments attached to a rectorship" in the
Episcopal Church: Hoffman's Law of
the Church, p. 418. Manifestly, the
possession of the particular status, meaning by that term the capacity to perform
certain' spiritual functions, or to hold
certain spiritual offices, carries with it
the right to the accompanying emoluments, and the one cannot be taken away
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without the destruction of the other:
Forbesv. Eden, 4 Ct. Seas. (3d Ser.) 157 ;
. c. L. R. 1Se. & D. App. 568; McMillan v. Free Church, 23 Ct. Seas. 1346,
1347 ; Law Reporter, Dec. 1855, 421432. The article last referred to, is attributed to Hon. Richard H. Dana, and
derives, of course, additional weight
from that fact. The writer says : "In
the case of a presbyter of the Episcopal
Church, the holding the office is essential to his being settled or officiating,
and thus obtaining compensation or emolument in any form. He qualifies himself for the office at great expense of time
and money, sacrifices all other means of
obtaining a livelihood in faith of the
contract between himself and the church,
that if qualified he shall be admitted,
and, if admitted, shall not be prohibited
from officiating, and thus earning his
living, except for certain causes set forth
in the constitution and canons."
It is unnecessary to enlarge. The
opinion in the principal case concedes
that the right to pursue any lawful avocation is in itself, a thing of value ; that
salary and emoluments are connected
with the rectorship of an Episcopal church
parish ; and while it is denied that the
right to the office of a clergyman is a
"vested right" in the sense of a "right
that cannot be suspended," it seems to
be admitted that such a right exists in a
"contingent and restricted" form. But
it is said that " the sentence of a church
judicatory, in a proper case, deprives of
the position, and salary and emoluments
are gone."
It is exactly here that the question
arises, what if those who assume so to
act, are not a judicatory? And if not,
is not a civil court bound to interpose as
against unlawful deposition or suspension, which takes away the right to office
and the payment of salary?
If any proposition would appear to be
settled in this country, it is that no man
has any power over another in matters

either religious or civil, beyond what
the law confers, except by that other's
own consent. It is possible that courts
would hold that such consent might be
given even to 'he extent of enabling a
majority to dispose of a minority in any
manner, at any time, under any circumstances, or that a particular office-bearer
of a church might do so, in matters of
ecclesiastical concern; though carrying
with them civil consequences, "but such
consent to be effectual must be clear on
the face of the compact. The law will
neither presume nor readily infer such
consent when civil interests are involved.
The liberty of the majority may he the
slavery of each individual, and of the
whole minority. That is not the kind
of liberty which the law of this country
favors. Still less does the law favor or
even recognise the liberty of one party
to a civil contract to break it with iinpunity or to interpret it in his own favor to
the prejudice of the other party. The
interpretation of all contracts belongs to
the civil courts, to the extent, in the first
instance, of ascertaining whether they
involve civil rights; and in the next
place, if they do, of vindicating or giving
redress for the violation of these rights;
and, although everyhuman tribunal must
be fallible, history has shown that nowhere else can these powers be so safely
lodged."
It is true that the complainant in the
principal case did contract and bind himself to submit to the government and
discipline of the Protestant Episcopal
Church. Anl if the contract by which
that church is constituted and which
alone furnished the authority to proceed,
bound him to submit to any mode of
procedure his ecclesiastical superiors or
brethren chose to adopt and to any conclusion they chose in any way to arrive
at, it may be he would have no locus
standi in a civil court, although the law
favors not such contracts and never cuts
off investigation; but that is the precise
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question which the complainant insisted
the court should examine into and determine, and which the Supreme Court
seems to decide cannot be done. So we
drift back to the initial question, what
position a church occupies in this country. If in law, they are mere voluntary
associations founded on contract, then it
is not perceived upon what ground courts
can decline the investigation, in a proper
case, into the terms and conditions of
6ueh contract, and the cases cited ante
fully sustain this view.
This is a logical conclusion from the
separation between church and state.
The effect of such separation was to forbid an ecclesiastical establishment ; to
deny to the regulations of the church,
the legislative sanction, and to her adjudications the authority of judicial decisions ; to leave the churches in this country to stand not as ecclesiastical but
civil bodies : Tyler on Ecclesiastical
104. It is insisted, however,
Law,
that "1causes spiritual must be judged
by judges of the spiritualty, and causes
temporal by temporal judges ;" and the
statute 24 Henry VIII. is cited. This
statute is, however, no authority for the
proposition, for it was passed alio intuitu.
The king having secretly married Anne
Boleyn, had determined on a rupture
with Rome. The independence of the
kingdom from all foreign jurisdiction
was the object aimed at, and in-making
the assertion, it was natural that the
highest dignity should be ascribed to the
estates of the realm, and particularly to
the spirituarty, on whose authority a
most important act was about to be done.
The object was to assert the power of
the spiritualty of the kingdom against
a foreign power, not to define the mutual relations of the spiritualty and temporalty within the realm, with a view
to a possible conflict of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it is substantially true,
that spiritual causes pertain to the spiritualty, and it may be admitted, that so
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long as spiritual sentences are directed
to taking their effect upon the consciences
both of the culprit and of others, civil
courts can not interfere; but when they
go farther and coercive jurisdiction is
claimed for those who pronounce them,
and temporal consequences emerge, the
case is changed. And the Lord of the
Church has Himself clearly indicated
that He claimed no temporal jurisdiction .for He replied,-when "1one of the
company said unto Him, ' Master, speak
to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me,' 'Man, who made me a
judge or a divider over you ?' "
It is only in the legitimate exercise of
her spiritual power that the church can
possess that high sanction which most
churches have claimed. If she exceed
her due powers, it is usurpation, and the
privilege derived from exercising the
powers committed by the Divine Founder
to His church, is gone.
Whenever his civil or proper rights
are involved the clergyman has the right
to stand at "Cnsar's judgment seat" as
the place "where he ought to be judged," happy if he finds the tribunal before which he appears "expert in all
customs and questions which are among"
the members of his church association,
but confident at least of justice.
III. The intervention will take the
shape of injunction whenever recognised
grounds of such equity interposition exist.If the case made shows that the
complainant is threatened, with illegal
action, the inevitable result of which is
irreparable injury, sufficient ground exists for this form of interference. Any
legal remedy is inadequate which is not
equivalent to the restoration of the status
quo. As the opinion under consideration does not discuss this branch of the
subject, further allusion to it is not required. Injunctions have been granted
in similar cases: Walker v. lainwright,
16 Barb. 486 ; Hagar v. Whitehouse,
Sup. Ct. Chicago, May T. 1863; Forbeq
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v. Eden, 4 Ct. Sess. (3d series) 157;
McIntosh v. Rose, 2 Ct. Sess. (N. S.)
255 ; Wilson v. Stranraer, 4 Ct. Sess.
(N. S.) 1294, Id. 957, 1476; 1298, 911.
The formidable objection is not to the
remedy but the time of its application.
But it was insisted for the complainant
that interference after sentence came too
late, as the sentence executed itself. And
to the objection that it could not be
known what the sentence would be, it
was replied that the law conclusively
presumes against those persisting in illegal action, the worst that may befall:
I Greenl. Ev. p. 21, sects. 15, 16, 18,
25, 34; p. 44et seq. ; 9 Clark &F. 251 ;
4 B. & C. 247, 255, 256. The rule that
proceedings at law will not be enjoined
until after verdict and judgment, relates
wholly to proceedings of courts created
by the supreme power of the state. In

such cases the jurisdiction of the common law courts is admitted, and injunctions issue upon the ground that such
jurisdiction is being made use of contrary
to equity, or when the question depends
on an equitable, arising on a legal right,
the court requires the admission of the
legal right as preliminary to the assertion of the equitable. In a propercase,
however, injunction may be granted at
any stage of the action, as to stay trial,
entry ofjudgment, &c. : 3 Daniell's Ch.
Pr. (Perkins Ed. 1865) 1726, 1727.
The subject ought not to be dismissed
without some reference to the ecclesiastical proceedings, but the length of this
note precludes further discussion. The
objections were to the jurisdiction of the
so-called court, and if they were well
taken, were decisive of the case.
M. W. FULLER.

Supreme Court of Colorado.
GRAHAM v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Telegraph Companies may make reasonable regulations concerning the transmission of messages, but cannot avoid liability for their own want of care or
skill in the performance of what they undertake to do.
A regulation that messages must be repeated by being sent back from the
station to which they are addressed is reasonable ; but where the action is not for
incorrect transmission of the message, but for failure to deliver it at all, the noncompliance by the plaintiff with such regulation is no defence.
In an action against a telegraph company for failure to deliver a message to
"ship oil as soon as possible," the plaintiff cannot recover for profits he might
have made had the message been promptly delivered., Such profits can not be
considered as fairly within the contemplation of the parties, and are too speculative and contingent in their nature to be a proper element in the measure of
damages.

This was a writ of error from the Arapahoe District Court.

The

facts are stated in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
BELFORD, J.-The declaration contains three counts. It is
averred that the plaintiff employed the defendant to transmit from
Denver, in Colorado, and deliver to Ashton & Tait, in Nebraska

City, in Nebraska, the following message:
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"1DmzvmE, Dec. 5th 1864.

"Ashton & Tait, Nebraska City.
Ship oil soon as possible -at very best rates you can.
WILLIAM GRAHAM."

It is further alleged that in consideration of the sum of $5 then
paid, the defendant accepted and agreed to deliver the same; but
that by reason of the unskilfulness, negligence and want of care
of the servants and employees of the company, the message was
not transmitted and delivered; by means whereof the said Ashton
& Tait did not ship the oil as requested, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay higher rates of freight on the same, amounting to
the sum of $500, and also that the plaintiff lost great gains and
profits by the delay thus caused in not shipping said oil, amounting
to the sum of $1500, and was otherwise put to great expense and
incurred great loss and damage.
The defendants for answer pleaded the general issue and four
special pleas. In the special pleas it was alleged that at the time
of the delivery of the several telegraphic messages in the several
counts of the declaration mentioned, the plaintiff was notified and
informed that in order to guard against mistakes in the transmission of messages over the lines of the defendant from Denver to
Nebraska City, every message of importance ought to be repeated,
by being sent back from the station at which it is to be received,
to the station from which it is originally sent; and that the defendant would charge fifty-five per cent more for repeating such
message than for sending or transmitting such message without
repeating the same; and that while the defendant would use every
precaution to insure correctness, the said defendant would not be
responsible to the plaintiff or to any other person for mistakes or
delays in the transmission or delivery of reeated messages, beyond
an amount exceeding five hundred times the amount paid for
sending the message.
It was further alleged that the plaintiff, well knowing the premises, did not at the time of delivering the message in the declaration mentioned to the defendant, nor at any time before or since,
request the defe.dant to repeat the messages, by sending the same
back from Nebra.ka City to Denver; nor did the plaintiff pay or
offer to pay to the defendant, the sum or price charged by the
said defendant for repeating the said several telegraphic messages.
To these several special pleas a demurrer was filed and sus-

GRAHAM v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.

321

tained. The defendant went to trial on the general issue, and
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed his
damages at $1039.59. The motion for a new trial having been
overruled the case comes here.
The first error assigned is the sustaining of the demurrer to
the special pleas. It is claimed by the appellant, that Graham,
having subscribed to the conditions printed on the back of the
paper on which the despatch was written, is not only chargeable
with notice of them, but that his right to recover is limited
thereby. It is further insisted that not having requested the
defendant to repeat the message, that he thereby released the
company from liability.
It is no longer a question of doubt that a telegraph company
has the right to make reasonable rules and rigulations, for the
proper conducting of its ordinary telegraphic business; and this
right has been recognised by many of the states by statutory
enactments, and in others by decisions of their courts. But while
this is the case, the doctrine has nowhere been carried to the
extent of exempting them from all responsibility for a want of
fidelity and care in the exercise of the employment which they
undertake to prosecute.
There are duties they owe the public arising out of the nature
of their employment which it would be impolitic and inexpedient
to suffer them to diminish or evade. Among these duties may be
mentioned the obligation to employ competent and skilful operators and other agents ind servants, in all respects competent for
the discharge of their particular duties; and further, to see that
they not only possess such skill, but that it is continually applied
in the particular business in which they are engaged. They cannot refuse to receive and forward messages, nor select the persons
for whom they will act. They must send for every person who
may apply, at a uniform rate, without any undue preference, and
accordi'.g to established rules and regulations applicable to all
alike.
In tie case of Ellis v. The American Telegraph Company,
13 All 234, BIGELOW, C. J., says: "There can be no doubt
that in the ordinary employments and occupations of life, men are
bound to the use of due and reasonable care, and are liable for
the consequences of carelessness or negligence in the conduct of
their business to those sustaining loss or damage thereby. We
VOL. XIX.-21
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can see no reason why this rule is not applicable to the business
of transmitting messages by telegraph. But the rule does not
operate so as to prevent parties from prescribing reasonable rules
and regulations for the management of the business, or establishing special stijulations for the performance of service, which if
made known to those with whom they deal, and directly or by
implication assented to by them, will operate to abridge their
general liability a~t common law, and to protect them from being
held responsible for unusual or peculiar hazards which are incident to particular kinds of business. Of course a party cannot
in such way protect himself against the consequences of his own
fraud or gross negligence, or the fraud or gross negligence of his
servants or agents. Nor can he escape all liability or responsibility in the perf6rmance of the service or duty which he undertakes. Nor can there be any difficulty or danger in the application of this principle so long as it is kept within a proper limit.
That limit is found by requiring in all cases, that- the conditions
and regulations by which a party seeks to limit his liability in the
conduct of his business, shall be reasonable. Such 'only, by the
rules of law, can a party be permitted to prescribe, and to none
other can those who deal with him, be held to yield their assent."
This brings us to the question whether the rule relied on by
the defendants in the special pleas, and which is set up in defence
of the plaintiff's claims, is a just and reasonable one, and such as
they had a right to prescribe and by which the plaintiff was
bound. It has been remarked by an eminent l.awyer, that "where
rules and regulations are in derogation of common right, or are
intended to restrict and limit liabilities to which the company
would otherwise be subject by reason of the duties imposed upon
it by law or the nature of its engagement, the validity of such
rules and regulations is a question of law."
Accepting this as true, how stands the rule relied upon in the
special plea? The gist of the action is the failure to deliver the
message. The complaint is not that the message was incorrectly
sent, or that it was inaccurately taken off the wires at Nebraska
City. If this was the gravamen of the action, we might hold
with the Kentucky and Massachusetts courts, that it was the duty
of the plaintiff to insure its accuracy by having it repeated. But
how could the failure to deliver the message be avoided by paying for having it repeated ? Can it be said that the operator at
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the other end of the line could insure the safe delivery of a message by repeating, when the negligence which occasioned the
failure occurred after the receipt of the message ?
The object of repeating a message is to correct errors and not
to avoid delays in delivering it. After transmission, an incorrect
message could be sent out and delivered as speedily as if it had
been verified and proved to be perfectly accurate.
Delays in the delivery of a message result from causes altogether different from those which produce mistakes in transmission, and it is reasonable that rules of limitation or exemption
should he adapted to the nature of the case: Scott & Jarnegan
on the Law of Telegraphs, § 113.
A message may be correctly transmitted from one point to another; may be correctly taken off the line; and the agent of the
company may through inattention fail to deliver it to the party
to whom it is directed. It could hardly be contended in this case
that the companyscould shield itself under the condition that the
party sending the message failed to pay for having it repeated.
The mere fact of having it repeated could not have insured its
delivery. The failure to deliver is not caused by imperfections
of instrumbnts and appliances, by electrical changes, or by a
break of the line at an intermediate point, but by the negligence
of the operator; and against this inattention and want of care
these rules and regulations cannot be permitted to provide. To
support the reasonableness of the conditions attached to the mesgage, our attention has been called to the case of Ellis v. American Telegraph Company, noticed above. The counsel citing
this cause must have overlooked the remarks of the chief justice
on page 288 :-1" It is hardly necessary to say that the question
whether the mistake or error in the despatch would have been
prevented or corrected by the repetition of the message in conformity to the regulations established by the defendants does not
appear to have arisen at the trial. W\hether it would have done
so was a question of fact for the jury. Of course the defendiznts
would be liable for any negligence causing damage which would
not have been prevented by a compliance with these rules." Until
the appellant can show that the failure to transmit and deliver
the message could have been prevented by having it repeated, the
above case can be of little avail to him.
The next authority relied on is that of Camp v. Western Union
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Telegraph Co., 1 Ietcalfe (Ky.) Rep. 166. In this case the
company, by way of defence, relied upon a notice of the terms
and conditions on which messages were received by it for transmission, and which are the same as those relied on here.
SA]IPSON, J., says: "There

is no allegation in the plaintiff's

petition that the mistake was occasioned by negligence, or was
the result of incompetency or want of proper skill on the part
of the agents who were employed by the company to act as
operators in the sending and receiving of despatches; but the
failure of the company to comply with its contract to transmit the
message correctly, is alone relied upon as the foundation of the
plaintiff's right to a recovery in the action."
It will be observed that the case at bar and the case cited
differ in other particulars. Here, the plaintiff charges that failure
to transmit and deliver the message was occasioned by "the carelessness, negligence, and want of skill of the defendants and their
agents, and through want of due care and attention to their
business." Here, the act complained of is the failure to transmit
and deliver the message, while in the case cited the message was
transmitted and delivered, but there was a mistake made in the
tenor of the despatch, making it read sixteen cents a gallon
instead of fifteen cents as written by the sender.
While we hold that it is competent for the company to provide
by rules and regulations against the unforeseen disarrangement
of electrical apparatus, and the imperfections necessarily incident
to the transmission of signs and sounds by electricity, yet it must
be conceded that these forces or accidents do not affect the ability
of the company to deliver the message to the party addressed,
after it has been taken off the wires and reduced to writing.
What is needed to secure delivery is fidelity, and to this the
company is bound in all messages.
In the case of Birney v. New York and Washington Telegraph
Co., 18 Md. 341-842, the plaintiff delivered to the company's
agent a message for transmission which was wholly forgotten by
the agent, and he neglected to send it at all. There was no
repeating price paid by the plaintiff. It was held by the court
that the company's notice with regard to the repetition of messages would not apply to a case of neglect, when no effort was
made to put a message upon its transit.
Much has been said about the peculiar hazards to which Tele-
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graph Companies are exposed. It is said that "the operating
apparatus of the telegraph leaves no record of the work done at
the place from which it is transmitted, and that therefore there is
peculiar liability to error in the non-transmission and transmission
of despatches." This is all true, and courts and legislatures have
been liberal in allowing companies to provide against such risks
as arise out of atmospheric influences and kindred causes. At'
this point they have properly stopped. To permit them to contract against their own negligence, would be to arm them with a
most dangerous power; one, indeed, that would leave the public
almost entirely remediless. It must be borne in mind that the public
have but little choice in the selection of the company which is to
perform the desired service. They do not select the agents or
employees, nor can they remoie them. They are bound to take
the company as they find it, and to commit to its agents their
messages however valuable they may be. Such being the case,
public policy as well as commercial necessity requires that companies engaged in telegraphing should be held to a high degree
of responsibility.
I have thus far examined this case on the pleadings without
alluding to the evideince elicited on the trial, and am of the
opinion that the court below committed no error in sustaining
the demurrer to the special pleas.
Another question equally important remains for decision.
On the trial below the court permitted the plaintiff, over the
objection of the defendant, to introduce evidence of the price of
coal-oil in Denver in December 1864, and in January, February,
and March 1865. The introduction of this evidence was doubtless permitted on the ground that the plaintiff had a right to
recover damages for the loss of profits he might have made, had
the despatch been delivered to Ashton & Tait, and the oil been
shipped by them and reached Denver in January or February.
It is claimed by the appellant that the court also erred in giving
the following instruction : "If the jury believe from the evidence,
that the defendant made an effort in good faith to transmit the
despatch given in evidence, and the same was transmitted from
Denver to Nebraska City, but that the despatch was not delivered
to Ashton & Tait by reason of the carrier of the defendant depositing the same in the post office at Nebraska City, then, the
jury are instructed that the defendant was not guilty of wilful
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neglect or negligence, and the plaintiff is not entitled to exemplary damages or 'smart money,' but is only entitled to such
reasonable damages as he sustained by the difference in freight.
and tke difference in price for which he sold his oil, and the price
for which he might have sold it had the despatch been delivered
in time and the oil shipped at the next opportunity that Ashton
& Tait had to ship the oil after they should have received the despatch."
The appellant rests his objection to the introduction of the evidence above referred to, on the ground that the plaintiff's declaration contained no special averment of the loss of profits.
In an action for refusing to let a lessee into possession the
plaintiff gave evidence of injury to his wife's business as a milliner,
without having averred it specially; but the court held it admissible under the general allegation of damage as going to show that
"the plaintiff had sustained inconvenience."
Ward v. Smith7, 11
Price 19; see also Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Co., 15 Wis. 827.
Before proceeding to discuss the right of the plaintiff to recover
damages for loss of profits, it is proper to remark that neither the
message nor declaration discloses the kind of oil that was to be
shipped-nor its quantity nor quality-nor where it was at the
date of the despatch-nor for what purpose such shipment was to
be made-nor whether such oil was intended for sale or for usenor at what point the profits were lost. For anything that appears in the declaration it might have been hair oil, fish oil or
wizard oil. The element of certainty has been left out. True,
the evidence shows that the plaintiff had on deposit with Ashton
& Tait as his forwarding agents sixty-nine boxes of coal oil, but
nothing of this kind appears in the declaration. Under the general averment that the plaintiff lost profits on oil, it is claimed
that the company should come prepared to dispute at the trial,
the value of any kind and any quantity of oil, at any place and
at any time. Under the ruling of the court below, the plaintiff
could have. as readily recovered for loss of profits on olive oil as
coal oil; for the profits of ten thousand gallons of oil as for the
profits of one. The defendant might have come prepared with
testimony as to the value and quality of one kind of oil, and yet
have been surprised by an inquiry as to another kind or quality.
"A chief object of formal written pleadings is to apprise the
opposite party of the real cause of complaint against him, so that
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he may in like manner interpose the proper answer on his part
and that on the trial he may not be taken by surprise.
"This requires that the injury complained of should be stated
with such fulness and certainty in the declaration as to leave no.
reasonable doubt of the particular transaction on which the plaintiff relies and which he intends to prove to establish his right
of action. These are common place principles and apply,to every
pleading which is required to be special in its nature." Relyea
v. Drew, 1 Denio 563.
But granting that the declaration was sufficiently specific in
all these points, was the plaintiff entitled to recover damages for
the loss of profits he might have made, had the despatch been
delivered and the oil been sent and received in Denver and sold.
In the case of Staats v. -Executors of Ten Ryck, 3 Caines Rep.
116, LIVINGSTON, J., says: "The safest general rule in all actions
on contract, is to limit the recovery as much as possible to an
indemnity for actual injury sustained, .without regard to the
profits which the plaintiff has failed to make, unless it shall clearly
appear from the agreement that the acquisition of certain profits,
depended on the defendant's punctual performance, and that he
had assumed to make good such a loss also."
To the same effect is Thompson v. Shattuck, 2 Metcalfe 618.
In the case of Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 426, HARRIS, J., says:
"The defendants insist, that if liable for consequential damages at
all they are only liable for such expenses as were actually incurred
by the plaintiff in attempting to put the machinery in operation,
and such actual loss as he had sustained in using the defective
machinery; while on the other hand the plaintiff claims that he
is entitled to recover as consequential damages, the profits he
could have made in the manufacture of oil, had the machinery
been complete and put up within the time limited. I agree with
the counsel for the plaintiff in the general rule for which he contends; that the party complaining of the breach of an executory
contract, is entitled to indemnity for the loss which the non-performance of the obligation by the other party has occasioned him
and for the gain of which it has deprived him. But the gain
contemplated by this rule, is only that which is the direct and
immediate fruit of the contract. Such gain may as properly be
regarded in estimating the damages resulting from a failure to
perform a contract, as any actual loss the party may sustain.
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But even the civil law rule which is much more liberal than the
common law in the measure of damages for the violation of an
execatory contract, confines the allowance for the loss of profits
'Ito the particular thing which is the object of-the contract,' and
does not embrace such loss of profits as may have been incidentally occasioned in respect to his other affairs. I cannot agree
with the counsel for the plaintiff that the estimated profits upon
the manufacture of a specified quantity of flax-seed into linseed
oil, constitutes a legitimate item of damages against the defendants. Such profits are entirely too speculative and uncertain to
make them a measure of damages."
The same rule islaid down in Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend.
842. In the case of .Diggsv. -Dwight, 17 Wend. 71, and
Millers v. The Mariners' Orurch, 7 Greenl. 51, it was held that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the expenses actually incurred in their business as a consequence of the failure of the
defendants to perform their contract, but their right to recover
damages for profits which they claimed they might have made
was denied.
Mr. Justice STORY, in the case of The Schooner Lively, 1 Galls.
815, commenting on this subject, says: "Independent, however,
of all authority, I am satisfied upon principle that an allowance
of damages upon the.basis of a calculation of profits is inadmissible. The rule would be in the highest degree injurious to the
interests of the community. The subject would be involved in
utter uncertainty. The calculator would proceed upon contingencies, and would require a knowledge of foreign markets to an
exactness in point of time and value, which would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles. Much would depend on the length
of the voyage and the season of the arrival. After all, it would
be a calculation upon conjectures, and not upon facts."
In the case of Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 490, the earlier New
York decisions are reviewed with great care,'and the conclusion
reached is, that the party injured by a breach of contract is entitled to recover all his damages, including gains prevented as
well as losses sustained, provided they are certain, and such as
might naturally be expected to follow the breach. They exclude
only uncertain and contingent profits; not such as, being the immediate and necessary result of the breach of contract, may be
fairly supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the
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parties when they made it, and are capable of being definitely
ascertained by reference to established market rates.
Pothier says: "In general the parties are deemed to have
contemplated only the damages and injury which the creditor
might suffer from the non-performance of the obligations in
respect to the particular thing which is .the object of it, and not
such as may have been accidentally occasioned thereby in respect
to his other affairs."
This rule, however, applies only to cases where, by reason of
special circumstances having no necessary connection with the
contract broken, damages are sustained, which would not ordinarily or naturally flow from such breach; as when a party is
prevented by the breach of one contract from availing himself
of some other collateral and independent contract, entered into
with other parties, or from performing some act in relation to his
own business not necessarily connected with the agreement. An
instance of the latter kind is, when a canon of the church, by
reason of the non-delivery of a horse, pursuant to agreement,
was prevented from arriving at his residence in time to collect his
tithes. In such cases the damages sustained are disallowed; not
because they are merely consequential or remote, but because
they cannot be fairly considered as having been within the contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract.
After examining at great length the various decisions on the
subject, SELDEN, J., remarks: "From these authorities and principles, it is clear that the defendants were not entitled to measure their damages by estimating what they might have earned
by the use of the engine and their other machinery, had the contract been complied with. Nearly every element entering into
such a computation, would have been of that uncertain character
which has uniformly prevented a recovery for speculative profits."
In the case of Squire et al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
98 Mlass. 232, which was an action in tort for failing to deliver a
message, BIGELOW, 0. J., says: "These rules in their application
to damages in actions of this nature are well settled and familiar.
A party who has failed to fulfil a contract cannot be held liable
for remote, contingent, and uncertain consequences, or for speculative or possible results which may have ensued on his breach of
duty, although they may be traceable to that cause. The reason
is, that damages of such a nature are not the natural or neces-
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sary incidents of a contract, and cannot be deemed to have been
within the contemplation of parties when they agreed together.
A rule of damages which should embrace within its scope all the
consequences which might be shown to have resulted from a failure
or omission to perform a stipulated duty or service, would be a
serious hindrance to the operations of commerce, and to the
transaction of the common business of life. The effect would
often be to impose a liability wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the act or service which a party hqd bound himself to
perform, and to compensation paid and received therefor. The
practical rule, founded on a wise policy, and at the same time
consistent with good sense and sound equity is, that a party can
be held liable for breach of contract only for such damages as
are the natural or necessary and the immediate and direct results
of the breach; such as might properly be deemed to have been
in contemplation of the parties when the contract was entered
into: and that all remote speculative and uncertain results, as
well as possible profits and advantages, and other like consequences which might have arisen from the fulfilment of the
contract, must be excluded as forming no just or legitimate basis
on which to determine the extent of the injury actually caused
by a breach."
While in this case the court disallowed the recovery of profits,
it held that the defendants, as a contracting party, were liable
for the injury actually caused by their breach of duty; and
commenting on the opinion delivered by himself in .Ellis v. Amerian Telegraph Co., 12 Allen 226, BIGELOW, C. J., remarks:
"There is nothing in the nature of the business which they undertake to carry on, that should except them from making
compensation for any neglect or default on their part."
There is another important case bearing on this subject, and
one worthy of great attention, as it seems to have been ably
argued by counsel and gravely considered by the court. I refer
to the case of Leonard v. The New York Telegraph Co., 41 New
York 565. The facts in that case were as follows :-On Sept.
24th 1856 Magill & Pickering, acting for plainitffs, delivered to
the Western Union Telegraph Company at Chicago a despatch
to be sent to one Shoals, at Oswego, as follows: "Send 5000
sacks of salt immediately." When the message was delivered, it
read "send 5000 casks of salt immediately." The term "sacks"
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in the salt trade designates fine salt, containing fourteen pounds,
and the term "casks" designates coarse salt in packages containing not less than three hundred and twenty pounds. Shoals
received the telegram on the day it was sent, and that evening
chartered a schooner to take the salt to Chicago, and shipped
by her 2738 barrels of coarse salt. The cargo of salt arrived at
Chicago on the 15th day of October. There being no market
for the same, it was stored away at the expense of the plaintiff.
The salt was worth at the time of its shipment at Oswego $1.60
per barrel. The cost of transporting the same to Chicago, ex:
clusive of insurance, was nearly 27J cents per barrel; and on its
arrival at Chicago, it was not worth at that place to exceed
$1.25 per barrel. The cause was tried before a referee, who
found "that the measure of damages to which the said plaintiffs
are entitled is the difference in the value of salt at Oswego and
Chicago, with the cost of transportation added thereto, with
interest from the time of the arrival of said salt at Chicago."
In commenting on this finding of the referee EARLE, C. J.,
says: "The measure of damages to be applied to cases as they
arise, has been a fruitful subject of discussion in courts. The difficulty is not so much in laying down rules as in applying them.
The cardinal rule undeniably is, that one party shall recover all
the damages which have been occasioned by the breach of contract
by the other party. But this rule is modified in its application
by two others. The damages must flow directly and naturally
from the breach of contract, and they must be certain, both in
their nature and in respect to the cause from which they proceed."
Under this latter rule speculative, contingent and remote damages,
which cannot be directly traced to the breach complained of, arc
excluded. Under the former rule such damages are only allowed,
as may fairly be supposed to have entered into the contemplation
of the parties when they made the contract, and as might naturally be expected to follow its violation. It is not required that
the parties must have contemplated the actual damages which are
to be allowed. But the damages must be such as the parties may
fairly be supposed to have contemplated when they made the contract. Parties entering into contracts usually contemplate that
they will be performed, not violated. As both parties are usually
equally bound to know and be informed of the facts pertaining to
the execution or breach of a contract which they have entered
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into, I think a more precise statement of the rule is, that a party
is liable for all the direct damages, which both parties to the contract would have contemplated as flowing from its breach, if at
the time they entered into it, they had bestowed proper attention
upon the subject and had been fully informed of the facts. * * *
I think'therefore that the rule of damages adopted by the referee,
was sufficiently favorable to the defendant. The damages allowed
were certain and they were the proximate and direct result of the
breach."
As to the measure of damages that may be recovered in an
action of tort or for breach of contract, I call attention to the
cases of Shepard v. Milwaukee Cas.Light Co., 15 Wis. 825; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. (U. S.) 807; Masterton v. The
Mayor 'c. of Brooklyn, 7 Hill 62; Fox v. Harding, 7 Cush.
522; Thompson v. Jackson et al., 14 B. Mon. 114; Davis v.
Talcott, 14 Barb. 611; Wade v. Leroy et al., 20 How. 84;
Waters v. Towers, 8 Exch. 401; Fletcher v. Tayleur, 17 Com.
Bench 21; Alder v. Keighly, 15 M. & W. 117.
If the authorities from which I have quoted state the rule
correctly, and I have no reason to doubt it, then the instruction
given by the court, so far as the same relates to the plaintiff's
right to recover for profits which he might have made, had the
message been delivered and the oil sent, &c., is erroneous, and the
jury having been misled by it, the cause must be reversed. And
as this case must go back for trial, it is proper that we should
add, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover not only what he paid
the company for transmitting the message, but also the increased
price of freight he was required to pay; and also all expenses
that the plaintift' incurred by reason of the failure of the defendant to fulfil the contract.
The length to which the opinion has already grown prevents
reference to other matters that have been assigned for error.
The cause is remanded for new trial, in accordance with the
principles announced in this opinion, and the parties have liberty
to amend their pleadings.
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United States -DistrictCourt, Northern District of Ohio.
STARKWEATHER v. CLEVELAND INSURANCE COMPANY.
A policy of insurance containing a clause that if the " title of the property is
transferred or changed," or "if the policy is assigned," the policy shall be void,
is not avoided by the bankruptcy of the assured and the assignment of his estate
to an assignee in bankruptcy, and the assignee may recover on it in case of a loss.

T is was a petition in the nature of a bill in equity, by an assignee in bankruptcy. On July 25th 1868, defendants issued a
policy of insurance to one Wells, for three years, on his house.
On February 7th 1870, the said Wells was adjudicated a bankrupt, and plaintiff was duly appointed his assignee; and on May
8th 1870, the premises insured were destroyed by fire.
The answer of the insurance company did not deny the loss,
or the sufficiency of the proofs, but based its defence on two clauses
in the policy which read thus: "If the title to the property is
transferred or changed, this policy shall be void ;" and secondly,
"If without the written consent of the company this policy be
assigned, it shall be void."
Griswold and Starkweather, for plaintiff.
Willey & Caryq, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
D. J.-The direct question presented the court for adjudication is this: Is the assignment of the register to the assignee
both of the policy and of the property insured a violation of these
two covenants in the policy, and does it exonerate the company
from liability? It is claimed by the petitioner that his assignment
and transfer were not the voluntary acts of the bankrupt, but
merely an assignment by operation of law, and that there is a
broad distinction recognised by the authorities between the voluntary and the involuntary assignments and transfers of the policy
and title. It is claimed by the defendant that a policy of insurance is a contract of personal indemnity, in no manner incident
to the estate, nor running with it, and that the language of this
policy is broader than the common and usual clauses against
alienation, and includes in it any involuntary change or transfer
of title.
It may be premised that as the covenants in this policy are in
SHERMAN,
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restraint of alienation, and entail a forfeiture, they must be strictly
construed. Though a contract voluntarily entered into by the
parties, no other meaning should be given to the language used
than a most rigid and literal interpretation permits: Crusoe v.
Bugby, 8 Wilson 234. The clauses against the assignment of
the policy, and against the transfers and change of title, may' be
considered together. The rules that appl:r to either apply to both.
These covenants are common to all insurance contracts. All
policies have the same clause forbidding the assignment of the
policy. The covenant against change or transfer of title in different policies varies somewhat in phraseology. In some policies
the language used is, "sold or conveyed in whole or in part ;" in
others, "shall not be alienated by sale or otherwise ;"'or as in
this, "the title shall not be changed or transferred." All these
expressions are in substance the same. To sell and convey, to
alienate or transfer the title, means an act whereby a thing is
made another man's; an act whereby a change in the ownership
of property is made from one person to another. And whether
these words are used in the active or passive sense can make no
difference in their construction. These covenants, therefore, on
the part of the assured, are that he will not assign the policy or
in any manner change his title to, or the ownership of, the
property insured.
I can find no decisions under the present bankrupt law bearing
upon the case at bar. The question must, therefore, be decided
upon principle and by the lights derived from decisions upon
analogous questions.
It is not to be doubted that the petitioner, by virtue of the
adjudication in bankruptcy, and his appointment as assignee, has
the control of this policy and of the property therein insured.
What rights and what title did he thereby acquire? Assignees,
according to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, 182, are of two
kinds: one in fact, and one-, law. An assignee in fact is one to
whom an assignment has been made in fact by the party having
the right to assign. An assignee in law is one in whom the law
vests the right and control in the property. To the latter class
an assignee in bankruptcy belongs. He is like an administrator,
executor, or guardian, upon whom, when appointed by the proper
authority, the law confers the right and power to control the
property thus committed to his charge, paramount to all others.
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But it does not give to, or vest in him, the absolute ownership in
his own right to the property. He is a mere trustee, accountable
under the law to the cestui que trusts, He holds the property
assigned to him in trust, and takes possession, by virtue of the
law, of all leases and policies, as well as other property. In leases
with covenants against alienation without consent, &c., it has
always been held that the leases pass to the assignee, and this by
virtue of the bankrupt law. Nay more; it has bpen held, Wadham
v. Mfarlowe, 2 Chitty 600, that in such case, the assent of the lessor to such assignment is to be presumed from the law itself. This
doctrine is nothing but the simple enunciation of the principles laid
down by Lord ELLENB0ROUGH in Copelandv. Stevens, 1 B. & Ald.
593. In substance he declares that the assignee is only a mere
agent for the bankrupt and for his creditors. He says: "An
assignment by the Commissioner of Bankruptcy is the execution of
a statutory power given them for a particular purpose; namely, the
payment of the bankrupt's debts. Nothing passes from them, fi
nothing was vested in them. Whatever passes, passed by force
of the statute, and for the purpose of effecting the object of the
statute. * * * * The object of the statute, and of the assignment, is the payment of the bankrupt's debts, and the assignee
is trustee only for that purpose."
Again in Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Vesey 100, and .Exparte Herbert, 13 Vesey 186, the court declared that "Assignees are not
considered as having the same rights as purchasers for a valuable
consideration, and that they are placed in the same class as
personal representatives of intestates." Of course I need not
quote authorities to show that Wells dying, this policy, notwithstanding its covenants, would pass to and vest in his administrator.
From these cases the principle is clearly deduced that an assignee
in the case of involuntary bankruptcy is only a trustee, an agent,
standing in the shoes of the bankrupt, with only power to do
what the bankrupt ought to have done, namely, pay the debts
out of his assets. By' the provisions of the bankrupt law, the
register makes the assignment and not the bankrupt. The latter
makes no paper and performs no act to divest him of the title.
But the control of this property merely and solely by judgment of
the court, is taken from him and vested in the assignee, who has
merely the power to do what the general as well as the bankrupt
law requires, namely, to appropriate the bankrupt's property to
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the payment of his debts. In other words, that the assignee is a
mere agent of the debtor to use his property in the payment of his
debts: It therefore follows from this, that the bankrupt remains
as much interested in watching over and guarding the insured
property after as before bankruptcy, and that the assignee does
not acquire such an interest in the policy, nor in the insured property, as to work the forfeiture contemplated by the clauses in
question: Phil. Ins. 107.
This conclusion Will be further strengthened by a review of the
cases upon the effect of an involuntary act of bankruptcy upon
the breaches of covenant in insurance and other like contracts.
Parsons, in his work on Contracts, 2d vol. 451, says: "On general
principles, that where property, insured against fire, is taken into
the possession of the law, for the benefit of creditors, the insurance
will remain valid, until the property is sold by the assignee."
The case of Bragg v. ew -EnglandInsurance Company, 5 Foster
289, was a suit brought on a policy which contained a clause that,
"if the property shall in any way be alienated, the policy shall
be void." The property was mortgaged at the time, and this fact
com~municated to the company. During the life of the policy, the
mortgage was foreclosed and the property sold. But the court
said "1that the title that became vested in the mortgagee by the
foreclosure was brought about by the operation of law. There was
no act or conveyance or transfer by the mortgagor to the mortgagee. We cannot, therefore, regard the foreclosure and sale as
an alienation." In the case of Smith v. Putnam, 3 Pick. 220,
there was a lease of a farm, with a covenant not to carry off any
hay, under a forfeiture of ten dollars per ton. Hay was attached
and carried off by the creditors of the lessee, and without his
consent. In this suit for the forfeiture the court said "that the
general principle to be deduced from all the cases was that covenants not to assign, transfer, &c., are broken only by a voluntary
transfer by the lessee. That the removal of the hay by sale or
execution, was not a voluntary act of the lessee, and therefore no
breach of the covenant." The leading case in England is Doe v.
Carter, 8 Term 57. Suit was brought on a lease, which contained
a covenant that the lessee "should not set over, assign, transfer, in any way dispose of the lease, without the written consent of the lessor." The lessee confessed judgment, and upon
execution issued thereon, the lease was sold. Lord KENYON
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said: "I adopt the distinction between th- ' acts which the party
does voluntarily, and those that pass in invitun. Judgment, in
contemplation of law, always passes in invitum, and therefore there
is no breach." The same doctrine was held thirty years before,
and will be found in Crusoe v. Bugby, 3 Wilson 234.
In the case of lVilkinson v. Wilkinson, Cooper's Ch. Cases
259, a father by will gave his son the rents and profits of certain
premises, with a proviso, that if the son assigned or disposed of
or otherwise encumbered the property he shall forfeit the estate.
The son afterwards became bankrupt. Sir W. GRANT, in deciding
the case, says: "Now courts of law have held that an assignment
by operation of law, which bankuptcy is, is not an alienation
within the meaning of a restraint against alienation."
Hilliard in his work on Bankruptcy 141, sums up the laN in
these words: "Property may be limited or leased, to be void or
revert back in the event of bankruptcy, and if a lease to a trader
contain such proviso, the term does not pass to his assignee, but
reverts back. But to prevent its passing, there must be an express
proviso to that effect. The usual covenant or proviso not to let,
assign, or transfer, without consent, &c., will not be sufficient.
The commissioners may still assign the lease to the assignees,
without such consent, and that such consent is presumed by operation of law. The distinction, however, is taken in England that
unlike bankruptcy, which is an involuntary proceeding, insolvency
being a voluntary proceeding on the part of the debtor himself,
is a breach of the covenant against assignment, and works a
forfeiture."
On. these authorities, it seems clear to me, that the clauses in
this policy forbidding its assignment, and the change and transfer
of the title to the property, have no more effect than similar words
in leases. Both are contracts between two persons, with this
difference, that leases are under seal, and therefore of a higher
nature. The cases cited establish the doctrine that bankruptcy
and judgments are involuntary, and do not avoid covenants against
assignments and transfers, either in leases or policies of insurance.
In this case the bankruptcy of Wells, the owner of the policy
and the property, was involuntary. By operation of the law the
policy and property were taken out of his custody and control,
and placed in the hands of the assignee, as the agent of the law,
to sell the same and pay his debts. The entire interest in the
VOL. XIX.-22
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property is sold under the law by the assignee. The loss provided for in this policy accrued while the property was in this
condition. It was still in law Wells's property, but by operation
of law in the hands of the assignee for the sole purpose of selling
and of applying the proceeds for Wells's benefit.
Decree for petitioner.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
HEASTINGS v. McGEE.
When the vendor of personal property makes fraudulent representations in re-

gard to its value, or is otherwise guilty of fraud in making or performing the
contract, the vendee has his election of remedies for the injury ; he may stand to
the lbargain even after he has discovered the fraud, and recover damages on
account of it, or he may rescind the contract and recover back what he has paid.
If he elects the former remedy and sues in case for the deceit, he is not bound
to return or make tender of the property.

TuIs was an action on the case for deceit in the sale of a horse.
The jury found, under instructions of the court, that the horse
was fatally diseased at the time of the sale, and that the defendant knew it, and assessed the plaintiff's damages at $103.50,
subject to the opinion of the court on the question of law reserved,
viz. : Whether the plaintiff having failed or neglected to offer to
return the horse to the defendant, but on the contrary having
retained and destroyed the animal without having made any such
offer, can maintain this action for purchase-money ? On the
hearing of the reserved question, the court directed judgment
to be entered in favor of the defendant non obtante veredicto,
whereupon the plaintiff took a writ of error to this court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WILLIAMS, J.-Where the vendor of personal property makes
fraudulent representations in regard to its value, or is otherwise
guilty of fraud in making or performing the contract, the vendee
has his election of remedies for the injury; he may stand to the
bargain, even after he has discovered the fraud, and recover
damages on account of it, or he may rescind the contract and
recover back what he has paid: Sedg. Dam. 296; 2 Kent's Com.
480, note A. ; Weston v. Downes, 1 Dougl. 28; Towers v. Barret, 1 Term 183; Boorman v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. 566; Warinq
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v. lason, 18 Id. 425; Whitney v. Allaire, 4.Denio 554. In the
case last cited JEWETT, J., says: A return of the property to the
vendor, or an offer to return, is in no case necessary, except to
enable the vendee to withhold or recover back the price. When
there is an actual disaffirmance of the contract, the title to the
property is revested in the vendor. In all cases of fraud, the
vendee, who alone has the right of disaffirmance, may remain
silent and bring his action to recover damages for the fraud, or
may rely on it by way of defence to the action of the vendor,
although there has been a full acceptance by him, with knowledge of the defects in the property. An affirmance of the contract by the vendee, with such knowledge, merely extinguishes his
right to rescind the sale. His other remedies remain unimpaired.
The vendor can never complain that the vendee has not rescinded."
The distinction between these two forms of action, as a remedy
for the fraud, is recognised in Pearsollv. Ohapin, 8 Wright 14,
the case mainly relied on by the court below to sustain its ruling
of the reserved question. There the action was assumpsit to
recover back the price paid for the land, and it was held that the
vendee must first tender a reconveyance. And why? Because
his action was in disaffirmance of the contract, and "he must
show that he had rescinded it by doing all that was necessary
and reasonably possible to restore the parties to the condition in
which they were before the contract." If he has done this, he
may waive his action of tort for the fraud, and sue in asmumpsit
for the money which he paid on the contract. But "he who
sues for damages for the fraud, say the court, affirms the validity
of the contract, Junkins v. impson, 2 Shep. 864; Whitney v.
Allaire, 4 Denio 554; or who knowingly accepts or retains any
benefit under it; Share v. Anderson, 7 S. & R. 63; Wilson v.
Bigger, 7 W. & S. 125; Gutzweiler v. Laclman, 23 Mo. 168;
or who uses the property as his own after the discovery of the
fraud, Mculloch v. Scott, 13 B. Mon. 172; Dill v. Comp, 22
Ala. 249." And therefore it is that a count for damages for
the fraud, and one for a rescission of the contract, are repugnant.
Here the declaration is not in assumpsit to recover back the price
paid for the horse, but in case to recover damages for the alleged
deceit, and as the authorities show, the plaintiff was not bound
to offer to return the horse before he could maintain the action.
The court, therefore, fell into an error in deciding that he was
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not entitled to recover because he had not offered to return the
horse. The attention of the learned judge does not seem to have
been directed to the pleadings, and he was doubtless led into the
error of treating the case as an action of a8sumpait to recover
back the price paid for the horse by the form in which the point
was presented and the question reserved. The judgment must
therefore be reversed, and the cause sent back to be tried on the
issue formed by the pleadings.
The gist of the action is the alleged fraud and deceit of the
defendant in inducing the plaintiff to buy the horse, believing
him to be of usual and ordinary health and soundness, and the
plaintiff's right to recover turns on the question whether the
defendant was guilty of the fraud and deceit with which he is
charged. If he was not, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
though the defendant may have known that the horse was fatally
diseased at the time of the sale.
Judgment reversed, and a venire facin de novo awarded.

United &ates Distriet Court, Eastern .Distriet of Wisconsin.
In Admiralty.
THE PROPELLER FREMONT.
A vessel employed on the lakes, between a port of the United States and a foreign
port, having shipped a seaman on verbal promise of certain wages, and no shipping
articles having been signed, the seaman may leave the vessel at any time. If
the seaman has drawn the full wages promised, and does not demand more before
leaving, he cannot recover a larger amount.

THE propeller was employed in trade between.the port of Sarnia, in Canada, and the city of Chicago, in connection with the
Grand Trunk Railroad. On the 24th of May, 1870, at Chicago,
the libellant shipped on board as first mate on verbal contract
with the master, at seventy dollars per month, no shipping
articles being signed. Libellant continued in service on board,
drawing his wages from time to time as he wanted money, until
the 31st of October following, when he left the vessel at Milwaukee, having drawn his full wages at the rate of seventy dollars per month, and not making demand for any larger sum.
The vessel was on a trip from Sarnia to Chicago, when libellant
left, having notice to return on board as the vessel was ready to
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put out, he declined or neglected to appear, and the vessel had
to be navigated to Chicago without a first mate, where the master
was obliged to procure another in his place. This was a libel
for the difference between what he had drawn and the highest
rate of wages paid during the time of his service, to persons in
similar capacity.
-Emmons and Hamilton, for libellant.
James .acAllister, for claimant.
MILLER, D. J.-It is contended on behalf of the libellant that
not having signed shipping articles in a printed or written contract, he was at liberty under the law to leave the vessel at pleasure and demand the highest rate of wages.
By the act for the government and regulation of seamen in the
merchant service, approved July 20th 1790 ( 1 Statutes at Large
131), every master of "any ship or vessel of the burthen of fifty
tons or upwards, bound from a port in one state to a port in any
other than an adjoining state, shall, before he proceed on such
voyage, make an agreement in writing or in print with every
seaman or mariner on board such ship or vessel," &c. By the tenth
article of the act, in addition to the several acts regulating the
shipment and discharge of seamen, approved July 20th 1840 (5
Statutes at Large 394), "All shipments of seamen made contrary to the provisions of this and other acts of Congress shall be
void, and any seaman so shipped may leave the service at any
time, and demand the highest rate of wages paid to any seaman
shipped for the voyage, or the sum agreed to be given him at his
shipment." The general scope of this act relates to vessels bound
on a foreign voyage, but the tenth article above quoted extends
to and includes all shipments of seamen. Even if these statutory
provisions did not embrace seamen shipped on vessels employed
in the lake trade, they should be enforced by the courts as correct
principles of maritime law. This vessel, at the time of the
shipment and service of the libellant, was employed in trade with
a foreign port. Libellant had drawn his full wages promised him
at the time of his shipment, and left at his pleasure. He took
advantage of the right extended to him under the Act of 1840.
Before leaving the service he had not demanded or given notice
that he claimed a larger amount. Libellant had a lawful right

